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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

CaseNo.20040260-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004), driving on a
suspended or revoked license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 53-3-227(3)(a) (West 2004), and driving without registration, a class C misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1303(l) (West 2004), in the Seventh Judicial
District, Grand County, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding.1 This Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).

1

The Utah Legislature has amended all of these statutes since 2000. The changes
are not relevant to the issues on appeal and do not affect their analysis. Therefore, for
convenience the State cites to the West 2004 version of the statutes.

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the jury instructions adequately convey the concept of "reasonable doubt"?
Standard of review. "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly states the law is
reviewable under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the
trial court's ruling." State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, rev'don other
grounds, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are directly relevant to the issue on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with three counts stemming from an
August 25, 2000 incident: driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44; driving on a suspended or revoked license, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(3)(a); and driving
without registration, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 4 L-la1303(1). Rl-2. Defendant pled guilty to the felony offense, and the trial court imposed
judgment. R33-42.
Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea. R44. The trial court denied
defendant's motion, and defendant appealed. R98-103. This Court reversed, holding that
the trial court failed to comply strictly with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
when it took defendant's plea. See State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, ^ 17, 73 P.3d 985.
2

Following remand, defendant's case was tried to a jury. The jury returned guilty
verdicts on all three counts. R150. The trial court imposed a prison term not to exceed
five years on the DUI conviction. R168-169. The court also imposed six-month and 90day terms on the misdemeanor counts, to be served concurrently with the prison term on
the DUI conviction. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R171.
After defendant filed his brief of appellant, the State moved this Court to stay
proceedings pending the Utah Supreme Court's disposition of three cases likely to set
forth controlling law—State v. Reyes, 20040078-SC; State v. Weaver, 200200735-SC;
and State v. Cruz, 200300199-SC. The Supreme Court subsequently entered decisions in
those cases, and this Court reestablished the briefing schedule. See Order dated August
9, 2005.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At about 8:20 a.m. on August 25, 2000, defendant and Dustin Yellow drove into
the Shirt Tail convenience store in Blanding, Utah. Rl75:60, 90. They picked up a
twelve-pack of beer and left. Rl 75:60-61. About an hour and a half later, they returned.
R175:6L Yellow came in to pay for gas. R175:66. Defendant attempted to pull his
pickup alongside the pumps. Rl75:62.
Jeff Rogers, the store manager, observed that defendant was having difficulty
lining his vehicle up with the pumps. Id. He saw the vehicle lurching and heard tires
screeching. Id. Defendant was "poppin' the clutch and jerkin' it" and "[s]tompin' on the
brake." Id. Rogers stated, "[T]he whole affair looked a whole lot like tryin' to teach
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your kids how to drive a stick shift. He was havin' a hard time with it. And he finally
got up to the dispenser." Id.
After defendant stepped out of the pickup, Rogers observed that defendant "was
standin' there and he could not quite hold himself." Rl75:63. After watching
defendant's behavior, Rogers called the Sheriffs Office. Id.; see also R175:66. He
reported that he had a drunk driver at the store and asked the Sheriffs Office to get
"somebody down there and fast, cause [Rogers] didn't want him leavin' before they got
there." Rl75:66.
Defendant and Yellow got into an argument beside the pumps. Rl75:67. Both of
them entered the store, still arguing. Id. Rogers observed that defendant's eyes were
glazed, that his face had started to sag, and that he was weaving. Rl75:68. When Rogers
heard defendant threatening Yellow, he again called the Sheriffs Office. Id.
San Juan County Sheriff Mike Lacy and Blanding police officer Mike Bradford
responded to Rogers' call. R175:76, 86. Sheriff Lacy took defendant into custody.
Rl 75:76. Sheriff Lacy could smell the strong odor of alcohol on defendant. Rl 75:77,
He asked defendant to submit to field sobriety tests. Id. Defendant refused. Id.
Defendant told Sheriff Lacy that he had drunk a twelve-pack of beer that morning.
R175-.78. Sheriff Lacy noted that defendant was "[v]ery agitated . . . at [Yellow]." Id.
He also observed that defendant had slurred speech, spoke with a "thick tongue," and had
a difficult time maintaining his balance. R175:78-79.
Sheriff Lacy transported defendant to the jail. R175:79. When the Sheriff took
defendant out of the patrol car, he had to hold defendant by the elbow to "[m]ake sure
4

that he didn't fall to the ground." Id. Even after his handcuffs were removed, defendant
moved from side to side as he was walking into the jail. R175:80. At the jail, defendant
was asked to take a breathalyzer test. Rl75:79. Defendant refused. Id.
Based on his training and experience, Sheriff Lacy opined that defendant could not
safely operate the vehicle. Rl75:80-81.
Defendant stipulated that "you may take it as proven that he was driving a motor
vehicle on a highway of this state on or about August 25, 2000, while his license to do so
was denied, disqualified, suspended or revoked, and that the vehicle was not registered as
required by law." R139 (Jury Instruction 4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Recent case law defeats defendant's claim that the trial court erred in giving the
reasonable doubt instruction. Utah courts have now expressly abandoned any
requirement that the jury be instructed that the prosecution must "obviate" all reasonable
doubt. Rather, the jury instructions as a whole must correctly communicate the concept
of reasonable doubt.
In this case, the instructions as a whole correctly communicated the concept of
reasonable doubt. They informed the jury that the State was required to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. They instructed that the jury should acquit if the State failed
to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions further defined and
explained the concept of reasonable doubt.

5

ARGUMENT
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ACCURATELY CONVEYED THE
CONCEPT OF REASONABLE DOUBT
Defendant claims that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was erroneous
because it informed the jury that "the [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt/' rather than that "the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Br.
Appellant at 11. Defendant argues that the instruction did not "comport with the three
part test set forth in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997)." Id. at 10.
District court proceedings. Defendant requested that the district court give a
reasonable doubt instruction telling the jury that the State must "obviate all reasonable
doubt." R156. After discussing the instruction with counsel and after ascertaining that
most of the jurors did not know the meaning of "obviate," the court declined to give the
instruction. R175:115120, 133-134, 153-154.
Instead, the court instructed the jurors that "[t]he [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." R140. The instruction stated:
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the
trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the
defendant should be acquitted.
The [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty.
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view
of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy,
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of
those bound to act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable
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instructions taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt,
namely, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime 'except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.5" Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
In State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, the Supreme Court again
rejected a defendant's claim that a jury instruction was erroneous because it "omitted the
term 'obviate.'" Id. at Ifil 2, 8. The Court observed that the jury instructions, "viewed as
a whole, adequately communicated to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt." Id. at \
8. One instruction "informed the jury that the State had the burden of proof and that 'a
defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. Other instructions further explained the concept of reasonable doubt. Id.
In the instant case, the instructions were adequate. Jury instruction 5 informed the
jury that "[t]he [S]tate must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." R140. That
instruction mirrors the instruction in Reyes, which informed the jury that "[t]he burden is
upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 2005 UT
33, Tf 2. The instruction further stated, "A defendant is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout
the trial." R140. It also defined "reasonable doubt": "Reasonable doubt is doubt based
on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence.... A reasonable doubt is a
doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the case." Id. It
further explained the concept of reasonable doubt: "Reasonable doubt is not a doubt
based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
8

reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of
those bound to act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt." Id
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Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted in is / '

day of _

lyrtevnwj/.

_, 2005.

MARKL. SHURh r>F
Attorney General

KAJLA+*

ANNEB.INOUYE
istant Attorney General
\ ttforneys for Appellee

~j

iT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /$/> day of

/y^fricu/ , 2005,1 either mailed first-

class postage prepaid or hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to
appellant's counsel of record, as follows:
KRISTINE M. ROGERS
712 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Counsel for Appellant
y<44K^^

A

JEANNE B.INOUYE
AssistanftAttorney General

10

?*<**=*>^

